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Abstract 
 
The subject of the study is the influence that the 
narrator’s image has on the understanding of the 
specific content of the basic concepts of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” –“time,” “history,” 
“recollection.” The author establishes that the 
narrator in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” 
appears in the form of “our consciousness,” 
“consciousness itself” and “object,” which, from 
the formal point of view, follow the same path of 
constitution and sublation of objectivity. “Time,” 
“history” and “recollection” act as the objective 
equivalents of the mediation of consciousness 
and objectivity, corresponding to the models 
specified by the narrator. To adequately 
understand the development of the “experience of 
consciousness” one must consider the specifics of 
each image of the narrator expressed in the 
peculiarity of the vocabulary and style of the 
book fragments, corresponding to each of them. 
The need to recognize the dialogical nature of 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit” is due to the fact 
that the meaning of the narrative as a whole is 
built out of the correlation of the same 
“experience” plot lines told from different points 
of view. Ananalys is of Hegel’s consideration of 
“history” as an object of a “consciousness 
experience” leads to the conclusion that he had 
developed a peculiar “phenomenology of 
history,” which is fundamentally different from 
the subsequent “Philosophy of History.” In this 
phenomenology not the logical concept, but the 
images of consciousness are the core of the 
historical process. “Recollection,” sublating 
“time” and “history,” not only opens the way to 
   
 
Аннотация 
 
Предметом исследования является влияние 
образа рассказчика на понимание 
конкретного содержания базовых концептов 
«Феноменологии духа» – «времени, 
«истории», «воспоминания». Автор 
устанавливает, что рассказчик предстаёт в 
«Феноменологии духа» в образе «нашего 
сознания», «самого сознания» и «предмета», 
проходящих один и тот же с формальной 
точки зрения путь конституирования и снятия 
предметности. «Время», «история» и 
«воспоминание» выступают в качестве 
предметных эквивалентов опосредования 
сознания и предметности, соответствующих 
указанным моделям рассказчика. Адекватное 
понимание развития «опыта сознания» 
требует учёта особенностей каждого из типов 
рассказчика, выражающихся в своеобразии 
лексики и стилистики соответствующих им 
фрагментов произведения. Необходимость 
признания диалогического характера 
«Феноменологии духа» связывается с тем, 
что смысл повествования как целого 
складывается из перекличек, возникающих 
вследствие воспроизведения одних и тех же 
сюжетов «опыта» с разных точек зрения. 
Анализ рассмотрения Гегелем «истории» как 
предмета «опыта сознания» побуждает 
сделать вывод, что им была разработана 
своеобразная «феноменология истории», 
принципиально отличная от последующей 
«Философии истории»: в качестве 
глубинного слоя исторического процесса в 
ней выступает не логическое понятие, а 
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the logical objectivity, but also allows us to 
imagine the completed “experience of 
consciousness” as a whole, which retains its 
significance at all subsequent stages of the 
evolution of Hegel’s philosophical and 
systematic thought. Based on the obtained results, 
the author suggests that the crisis of the Hegelian 
encyclopedic model was largely due to the 
oblivion of Phenomenology as its transcendental 
foundation, which retains its significance even 
after the development of Logic as a speculative 
justification of the system. 
 
Keywords: Hegel’s philosophy, “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit,” “experience of 
consciousness,” narrator’s image, structure of the 
subject of experience, dialogical nature, time, 
history, recollection. 
 
образы сознания. «Воспоминание», снимая 
«время» и «историю», не только открывает 
путь к логической предметности, но и 
позволяет представить завершившийся «опыт 
сознания» как единое целое, которое 
сохраняет значимость и на всех последующих 
этапах эволюции философско-
систематической мысли Гегеля. На 
основании полученных результатов автор 
высказывает предположение, что кризис 
энциклопедической модели философской 
системы Гегеля был в значительной степени 
обусловлен забвением Феноменологии как её 
трансцендентального основания, которое 
сохраняет своё значение и после разработки 
Логики как спекулятивного обоснования 
системы.  
 
Ключевые слова: Философия Гегеля, 
«Феноменология духа», «опыт сознания», 
образ рассказчика, структура субъекта опыта, 
диалогический характер произведения, 
время, история, воспоминание 
 
Introduction 
 
The traditional concept of philosophical texts as 
messages claiming the status of “sub specie 
aeternitatis” is only partially true. In reality, the 
modern reader must take into account not only 
the time of the creation and circumstances that 
influenced the philosophical works, which is 
traditionally considered in the process of 
acquaintance with the historically philosophical 
literature, but also the special features of the 
subject, whose “voice” in the end “freezes” in the 
form of a philosophical text and thereby 
perpetuates the image of its author and the 
spiritual atmosphere of the era. The history of 
philosophy has brought us many monuments, 
which we can comprehend only by realizing 
“with whom” we are entering into a 
conversation, by envisioning the narrator’s 
image chosen or constructed by the author, and 
by answering the question, which role in the flow 
of the narration has been assigned to us, readers. 
Perhaps the Plato’s dialogues will forever remain 
the most significant among such monuments; it 
is in them the image of Socrates is recreated, a 
person, which has become an indispensable 
companion for anyone who decides to study 
philosophy. 
 
To explain the focus of the present study, the 
mention of Socrates is also advisable, because his 
image in the dialogues of Plato has, as is known, 
evolved, and he gradually lost his historically 
concrete and personal character, acquiring the 
features of a mask of a “crafty questioner.” 
Similarly, in the present article, the “narrator’s 
figure” is comprehended as an instance of the 
text that is not connected with any historically 
concrete subject, and is specially modeled by the 
author to engage the reader in the movement of 
the “experience of consciousness.” 
 
However, in this respect, “The Phenomenology 
of Spirit” turns out to be extremely demanding of 
its reader because of the special way it is 
constructed, representing not only one, but 
several narrators. In this work the “experience of 
consciousness” unfolds itself “non-linearly,” 
which prompts the reader to reconstruct the flow 
of the narrative on the basis of the echoes that are 
produced in the process of “phenomenological 
dialogue” between the fragments of the text told 
by different narrators. Having joined this 
dialogue, the reader, according to Hegel’s 
intention, has to go through all stages of self-
knowledge, at which he will meet different 
narrators, whose “messages” differ from each 
other not only in the way the material is 
presented, but also in the peculiarities of the 
vocabulary and the style of the narrative. The 
most important of these specific features of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit,” which are difficult to 
directly see without additional explanation, 
especially when referring only to the translations 
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of Hegel’s work in other languages (For instance, 
as Kenley R. Dove noted, the dative case is used 
in the process of describing the objective mode 
of the experience existence, which is assessible 
to the consciousness already under study, and 
accusative case is used in the process of 
describing the flow of the “certainty,” in which 
(initially only for the “phenomenologist” 
observing consciousnesses) the process of the 
emergence of a new object is being revealed 
(Dove, 1970; 1983). However, this most 
important feature of the phenomenological 
narrative is not reflected in the translations of 
Hegel’s work.), will be the subject of our 
consideration. 
 
It should also be noted that the method of the text 
construction and the nature of the narration of 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit” can not be 
considered as a consequence of some random 
circumstances that happened to be a reflection, 
for example, only of the subjective intentions of 
the author at the time of writing the book. In that 
case the nature of the presentation of Hegel’s 
ideas could have been changed, the book could 
have been written differently, if the author had 
made other decisions. However, it is necessary to 
discard of such assumptions every time, after 
each reading, for the reason of their complete 
inconsistency with the book’s structure and 
meaning, and to admit that in this ingenious 
creation its “formal” components, characterizing 
not individual ideas, but the method of 
constructing the whole, could not be different 
without destroying at the same time the whole 
complex structure of Hegel’s thought. 
 
Methodology 
 
A reader immersed in “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit” after the acquaintance with the other 
works of the philosopher, in particular with “The 
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences” and 
“Science of Logic” (seeing that Hegel’s works 
are usually read in that order), will be surprised 
by the fact that the language of “The 
Phenomenology” is not very similar to that 
“ballet of categories,” as A.F. Losev put it 
(Troickij, 2007), which is often considered 
almost the most memorable of Hegel’s 
trademarks. Of course, the language of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” is also very complex, 
but it is a completely different kind of 
complexity, it does not come down to the 
abundance of words that are “incomprehensible” 
to an unprepared reader and the strict order of 
their arrangement. In this regard, it should be 
noted that even very competent studies, which 
are focused on the understanding of the nature 
and characteristics of Hegel’s language and style 
as a whole (Bodamer, 1969; Suhachev, 2007; 
Vernon, 2007), are insufficient for the reader of 
“The Phenomenology,” since its intricate 
composition and language need special 
explanations even against the backdrop of the 
proverbial complexity of Hegelian philosophy. 
Reading “The Phenomenology of the Spirit” 
implies the need to take into account the 
universal significance of the concept of the 
experience (die Erfahrung) for the very 
construction of the work, which determines the 
transcendental orientation of the interpretation of 
objectivity in the Hegelian system as a whole: 
you should only embrace what has become your 
experience, was verified by reasoning, acted as 
certainty independent of the existential status of 
its substrate. This paradigm has been living in 
European culture since the era of Bacon and 
Descartes, it is especially substantiated in 
“critical philosophy” and Hegel agrees with it 
completely and, in “The Phenomenology,” 
proves the “constructual” nature of all types of 
objectivity that will be the object of consideration 
in his philosophical system, their dependence on 
the transcendental subject determining their 
existential status and structure. Thus, the key to 
understanding the subject is the activity of the 
subject, a certain type of consciousness, which 
does not appear to Hegel as a “difficult problem,” 
because the “experience” does not go beyond its 
borders and is located entirely in the space of the 
active subject’s awareness of its objective 
content of his cognitive activity. 
 
The “experience of consciousness” recreated by 
the philosopher in this work turns out to be 
thematically heterogeneous, not reducible to the 
problems of the scientific disciplines, that’s why 
it is expressed mainly using the vocabulary of 
everyday speech. However, in places, this 
vocabulary “rises” to the level of scientific 
terminology, if the author finds it possible to 
delve into the internal content, into the 
“structure” of the described objectivity. The 
imagery in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” is 
also exceptionally important (Verene, 1985; 
2007). For instance, it is no coincidence that the 
last lines of the book were a changed Schiller’s 
couplet: the need to synthesize the diverse 
content and the “simplicity of the outlook,” to 
bring it into one single “image,” “Gestalt” (Kohl, 
2003), no longer allows the author to be satisfied 
with the conversational unhurried speech, so 
common in philosophy. In this regard, it should 
be noted that the main mistake that the interpreter 
can make in his perception of the book’s 
narrative is an unjustified striving to 
“conceptualize” the Hegelian text, forcibly 
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building a certain “category system” out of the 
sequence of the many “remarks” made by the 
participants of the dialogue. Gustav Shpet had 
correctly noted that “the terminology that is clear 
in the application to one stage turns into a 
complete allegory at the other”. On the other 
hand, as was noted above, we do not always have 
reasons to perceive this“ repeating unity of the 
verbal expression” (Spet, 1959) as 
“terminology,” because the latter presupposes a 
substantial unity as well as stability and certainty 
of expression, which are not at all characteristic 
of “The Phenomenology of Spirit.” 
 
Of course, these particularities of the language of 
“The Phenomenology” are caused not only by the 
thematic heterogeneity of the “consciousness 
experience” and the dialogical nature of its 
presentation to the reader, but also by the varying 
degree of the “elaboration” of the text. Carefully 
edited Introduction and the first four chapters 
look more concise and definite in meaning, while 
the last chapters of the book, on which Hegel 
worked in a catastrophic hurry, seem more like a 
sequence of drafts coordinated by the integrity of 
the unfolding plot. However, it is clear that all of 
them were to some extent prepared by the author 
for publication. But be that as it may, the noted 
features still require the reader to pay attention to 
the authorship of the remarks made by different 
“characters” in the dialogue, and how these 
remarks form a substantial unity (if only 
relative), and consider which strategy of 
interpretation of this complex work is capable to 
become a source of new, deeper ideas about its 
actual content. 
 
In a similar manner, the method of historically 
philosophical reading of “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit” should take the heterogeneity of its 
subjects, dialogism as a characteristic of the 
presentation method and the forced rush that did 
not allow Hegel, by his own admission, to 
achieve proper perfection of the book’s “form” 
as the most important factors determining the 
substantial and stylistic diversity of Hegel’s work 
(In his letter to Schelling dated May 1st 1807, 
Hegel speaks about the “wretched confusion,” 
which did not only surround the whole process of 
publishing of “The Phenomenology,” but also “in 
some way affected the composition of the book,” 
regretfully acknowledging the “disturbance of 
the form in the last parts” (“Unform der letzten 
Parteien”), which was caused by the influence of 
the external circumstances (Hegel, 1971).), as 
well as the demarcation established and 
consistently sustained by the author between 
those “images of consciousness,” to which he 
“gives the floor” at successive stages of 
“experience,” and which become, albeit 
“constructed,” but completely independent 
“subjects of speech” within the boundaries of 
their sections. 
 
Results 
 
But what are these “stages”, these “images” and 
“types” of consciousness? As it often happens in 
the humanities, the answer to this question 
actually lies “on the surface” and is presented in 
the text under study, you only need to see it as an 
“answer,” to understand the significance of the 
seemingly well-known and repeatedly quoted 
formulas, in which only one thing went 
unnoticed – the fact that they are the answer to 
questions that were not raised by the interpreters 
before. So, let’s try and read the first sentence of 
the main text of the work: “Knowledge which is 
our object at the outset, that is, immediately, can 
be nothing but immediate knowledge, knowledge 
of the immediate, that is, of what is” (Hegel, 
2008) (hereinafter, “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit” is cited in the translation of Terry 
Pinkard). The Hegelian formula indicates the 
following: 1) the consciousness of the author and 
the reader is “our consciousness,” for which the 
forthcoming movement will be unrevealed; 2) 
the consciousness, which constitutes “our” object 
is “consciousness itself”; and 3) “its” object is 
“immediate or actual.” Thus, in the very 
beginning, Hegel singles out the perspectives of 
the “observing” and the “observed” 
consciousnesses, and from the moment of 
crossing the boundaries of the initial concept of 
the “Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness,” i.e. from the beginning of 
Chapter VI, he distinguishes the self-
consciousness of its “object”, and thereby 
introduces the reader to the “characters,” which 
are engaged in the dialogue. And the reader, 
following the author himself, has to identify 
these three levels in his consciousness (since we, 
strictly speaking, have no other consciousness 
except our own) and imagine them as the subject 
of the narrative, give them the status of the 
narrator. (Already at this point it becomes clear 
that the task of this extraordinary book is not to 
communicate some information to the reader, but 
to clarify and “structure” his consciousness, his 
“constitution” in the broadest sense.) And since 
each of these levels resides in the initial unity of 
consciousness (author’s and reader’s), the result 
of the “experience of consciousness” from a 
formal, logical point of view should turn out to 
be one and the same – it must identify the very 
specific model of mediation of consciousness 
and objectivity, which Hegel named “infinity” 
(“true infinity” in “Logic”). 
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In accordance with the indicated “assignment of 
roles,” “experience,” which ends with the 
achievement of “infinity,” is first gained by “our 
consciousness,” then by “consciousness itself” 
and, finally, by the “object.” Of course, it is 
unacceptable to describe the phenomenological 
movement in a simplified, unnecessarily 
“mechanical” manner, as if its stages could be 
presented as parts in different to each other. In 
fact, all the “participants of the dialogue” interact 
in the process of revealing the “experience of 
consciousness,” and, in order to understand the 
structure and dynamics of this complex dramatic 
“play”, it is necessary to carefully delimitate the 
“statements” of the “characters” and to see them 
as a whole that is ending with the “Absolute 
knowing” chapter. Right after he finished 
working on the book, Hegel had said that “The 
Phenomenology” is a whole that “by its very 
nature is ... an interweaving of transitions” 
(Hegel, 1971). 
 
So, “The Phenomenology of Spirit” does not so 
much provide some “information about the 
world” (in the end, the sections, in which Hegel 
did not manage to get rid of the corresponding 
fragments or which he couldn’t reduce to 
extremely concise formulas, he recognized as the 
least successful) (The author admits: “The 
inclusion of the particulars, as I feel, has 
prevented the consideration of the whole” 
(Hegel, 1971).), but restores, as a whole, a 
“structure of consciousness” that makes possible 
cognition (“experience,” “die Erfahrung des 
Bewusstseins”) and self-reflection of the subject 
involved in this process. Of course, to some 
extent, it can be said that any real philosophy 
pushes the subject to self-reflection, which has 
no place in the “ordinary” world. As Merab 
Mamardashvili (2002) notes in his “Kantian 
Themes,”“we see the cause-and-effect 
relationship and don’t see ourselves as part of the 
order, which, having established itself as an 
order, allowed us to see the cause-and-effect 
relationship in the world”. Kant and Hegel 
merely ended the two millennia-old tradition of 
“concentrating the attention” on the thinking and 
acting subject that was considered “excessive” 
for the conventional world. “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” turned out to be 
extremely deep and diversified, therefore, its 
consideration as one of the first attempts to 
identify the structure and dynamics of the 
“experience of consciousness,” which requires 
the delimitation of the “subjects” of the narrative 
and the reconstruction of the “dialogue” 
connecting them, seems especially promising as 
a basis for analysis of all the substantive aspects 
of the work. 
The presented correlation of the subjects of the 
narrative also determines the special structure of 
the phenomenological objectivity, and the 
comparison of the movement of “The 
Phenomenology” content with the categories of 
“The Philosophy of Spirit” (“subjective spirit,” 
“objective spirit” and “absolute spirit”), which is 
often seen in the historically philosophical 
literature (for instance, in the works of György 
Lukács), clearly does not correspond with the 
structure of this objectivity. Highlighting these 
categories within the boundaries of the 
encyclopedic system (mainly for pedagogical 
purposes), Hegel takes into consideration not 
only the differences in the certainty and the 
nature of the process expression of spirit 
formation, but also the existential status of the 
spirit “carriers.” However, the latter 
circumstance has no significance for the 
movement of the “experience of consciousness” 
described in “The Phenomenology of Spirit,” 
which unfolds in the direction of concretization, 
complication of the consciousness correlation 
structure and the objectivity, regardless of which 
substrate or “material” this structure is realized 
in. 
 
It is also fundamentally important that the 
dynamics of the “experience of consciousness” is 
defined in “The Phenomenology” as the place 
that “our consciousness” occupies in the 
structure of phenomenological objectivity, 
providing it with a “leading” role in the 
movement of the “experience.” Quite often, the 
activity of “our consciousness,” which underlies 
the development of the plot, appears 
immediately, as, for example, in the famous 
place of Chapter I, where Hegel says that “we” 
must “force” “consciousness itself” to show us 
those “here” and “now” which it implies (Hegel, 
2008). In the Introduction, Hegel brilliantly 
shows that “our consciousness” is “one step 
ahead” of “consciousness itself” precisely 
because it sees the emergence of its object, a 
process inaccessible for observing consciousness 
immersed in experience that occurs as if “behind 
the back of consciousness” (Hegel, 2008); what 
for “our consciousness” appears “at the same 
time as a movement and a coming-to-be,” 
appears in experience “only as an object” for the 
“consciousness itself” (Hegel, 2008). Due to the 
fact that “our consciousness” is freed from a 
direct connection with the object (looks at it 
“through the eyes of consciousness itself”), it 
also sees the need for the entire sequence of 
forms of consciousness existence, i.e. it elevates 
the “experience of consciousness” to a 
systematic form, to “science.” 
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“Our consciousness” is not “woven” in this 
process by itself and is spared from the errors that 
accompany any experience, and therefore, it sees 
the “trajectory” of further development of the 
experience even before the “consciousness 
itself.” That’s why the reader, plunging into this 
unusual book, should be aware of the 
“dialogical” nature of Hegelian narrative from 
the very beginning, should clearly distinguish the 
“remarks” of the three indicated “characters,” 
sequentially identifying his own position with 
them. Their “voices” possess an individuality, 
and so, the interpreter should try and recognize 
it, adequately understand and convey it using the 
language of his culture and era. In the movement 
of the “experience of consciousness,” each of the 
“actors” – each consciousness – performed his 
role in the “play” of “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit,” responding to the signs from the author – 
“director.” In similar manner, the interpretation 
can also take place only in the event that these 
“voices” will not be confused, that the “volume” 
of the philosophical speech of the author will be 
reproduced. 
 
Now, the main point of the article can finally be 
secured: to understand the idea, the principle 
orientation of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” 
and its real philosophical content, one must take 
into consideration the position of the narrator. 
However, any “formal” principle of 
interpretation can be assessed as fruitful only if it 
allows to better understand the real “fabric” of 
the text, line by line revealing the meaning, 
lurking in the statements that form the narrative; 
the significance of the “method” of reading is 
determined only by how new and significant the 
results of its use in the process of solving specific 
research problems are able to turn out, how 
significant is the “content” obtained with its help. 
In this case, considering the distinction between 
“our consciousness,” “consciousness itself” and 
“object” as participants in the tripartite dialogue, 
allows not only to give an innovative solution to 
the problem of the structure of the work and its 
relation to the “mature” Hegelian system 
(Korotkikh, 2011; 2015), but also to take a fresh 
look at the entire figuratively conceptual course 
of “The Phenomenology,” give a critical 
assessment of the previous interpretations that 
did not take into account the dialogical nature of 
Hegel’s work (Korotkikh, 2019). However, 
selecting the material for the confirmation of the 
value of the proposed understanding of the 
phenomenological experience by the subject, we 
had to consider the length of the article, 
therefore, were strict ourselves to clarifications 
that relate only to the three concepts of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit”, which seem to be the 
sequential steps of understanding the same 
structure of mediation of objectivity at the level 
of “our consciousness,” “consciousness itself” 
and “object.” However, on the other hand, these 
concepts are so fundamental and significant for 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit” that each of them 
deserves to become an object of independent 
detailed consideration. 
 
The concepts, the reflection in the 
phenomenological experience of which we will 
try to identify and analyze, are time, history and 
“recollection” (die Erinnerung). In accordance 
with the approach proposed above, what 
consciousness initially comprehends as time, the 
universal form of mediation of existence and 
otherness, then appears in the form of history, an 
infinitely diverse extensive sequence, merging 
into the immediately experienced existence of an 
individual, and then, at the level of the spirit, as 
the “deep objectivity,” acts as “recollection,” 
“self-deepening” of the initial subject of the 
“experience,” of “our consciousness.” It should 
be said here, that it would be extremely difficult 
to see the unity of these concepts outside of a 
clear understanding of the status of “our 
consciousness,” “consciousness itself” and 
“object” as subjects of experience that go deeper 
and deeper into the objectivity constituted by 
consciousness. Indeed, why must “time” lead to 
“recollection” through “history”? However, the 
“hierarchy” of the subjects of experience reveals 
also the order of change in the process of 
experience of the mediation forms of objectivity, 
starting with the model of “time” and ending with 
“recollection.” The emphasis on “recollection,” 
which Hegel makes in chapter VIII, convinces us 
that “The Phenomenology of Spirit” as a whole 
is a discursive description of “experience” 
corresponding with “time” and “history,” the 
only way of understanding the spirit as the source 
of all reality within the boundaries of 
philosophical knowledge (at least Hegel thought 
so in the Jena period of creativity) (Verene, 1985; 
2007). 
 
As a basic concept defining a conceptual and 
discursive comprehension of the moments of the 
whole that appear in it, the time allows us to see 
the connection between universal and singular 
(what Hegel calls “the middle term of the 
syllogism” in accordance with the terminology of 
formal logic), and to find specificity for the 
philosophical consideration of objectivity. 
However, the concept of history is, of course, the 
central among these three concepts. The specifics 
of the interpretation of history in “The 
Phenomenology” can be judged by the famous 
fragment of chapter V, in which Hegel proclaims 
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his (so often criticized) position that wild life has 
“no history” (Hegel, 2008). However, let’s take 
notice of the fact that comparing history and 
organic being as two “middle terms” of the 
“syllogisms” for “our consciousness” 
demonstrates not only the fact that the wild life 
world has “no history” because its “middle term” 
does not have real unity (from life as a universal, 
organic nature directly falls into the unity of the 
existing being), but also that the familiar history 
of events and acts is only an objective existing 
being of a certain “deep” system of the 
formations of consciousness, phenomenology of 
the spirit: Hegel presents the world history here 
as the objective existence of the system of the 
shapes of consciousness. Therefore, history in its 
direct concept only reflects a more fundamental 
and exclusively spiritual process in the form of 
“random” events and actions of individuals, and 
to understand history means to reproduce this 
process as an internal content of what is given in 
an ordinary form only externally. The presented 
conclusion defines the fundamental role that 
“recollection,” “die Erinnerung,” receives in 
“The Phenomenology.” Donald P. Verene (1985) 
fairly correlates “die Erinnerung” not only with 
“the recollection,” the accumulation of images of 
consciousness, but also with “the inwardizing,” 
the “deeper” penetration into the content under 
study, noting that “The Phenomenology” as a 
whole can be represented as a “process of the 
inwardizing of the subject”. Therefore, in time, 
says the philosopher, “real history” appears 
before the comprehension, which happens by 
penetrating its essence (die Erinnerung, the 
inwardizing), in the form of phenomenology of 
the spirit, but only this comprehension allows us 
to understand both history and time, which act as 
conditions of the philosophical knowledge (die 
Erinnerung, the recollection). 
 
Thus, on the foundation of “recollection,” Hegel 
builds a certain “phenomenology of history,” 
which, it seems, has not been noticed by any of 
the researchers so far! Indeed, the substance of 
history here is not a concept, but a stream of 
images (“gestalt”) of consciousness. It is 
unacceptable to reduce them to concepts, as is 
stated by the same Donald P. Verene, therefore, 
it is also impossible to identify the 
“phenomenology of history” with the familiar to 
us lecture course on “The Philosophy of 
History.” In addition, “The Phenomenology of 
Spirit” has a complex linear-cyclic structure 
(Korotkikh, 2011), which means that the problem 
of assessing the specifics of the Hegelian 
approach to comprehending history in each of the 
sections of “The Phenomenology” is surfaced. 
And already the first look at the formulas of the 
various parts of the text, which indicate the role 
of time and history in the phenomenological 
movement, reveals how much there is of the non-
trivial and still not explored by philosophy 
historians in the Hegelian judgments, how much 
the analysis of “The Phenomenology” from the 
indicated point of view can enrich our ideas 
about Hegelian “historicism.” 
 
However, the culmination of the development of 
the “phenomenology of history” – that layer of 
the phenomenological narration that until now 
has not attracted the interest of researchers (after 
all, we admit that all the plots of “The 
Phenomenology” in one way or another came 
down to the scheme of “The Philosophy of 
History”) – happens in the last fragments of 
chapter VIII. There, the comprehension of 
history as the “middle term” of “the syllogism” 
that brings together “time” and “recollection”, 
acts as a result no less important than the 
constitution of speculative objectivity, which 
gives the logical idea the freedom to unfold. The 
“phenomenology of history” is like a glance that 
the philosopher casts back, examining (in 
“recollection”) once again the entire path of the 
finished “journey to discovery,” and “The 
Science of Logic” is a “new country” opened 
through the phenomenological movement, a 
sphere of the activity of the spirit, which is not 
restrained by “objectivity” anymore. Unlike the 
“Logic,” which overcomes time and “falls out” 
of history, in the “phenomenology of history” 
time is alive, “Spirit necessarily appears in time, 
and it appears in time as long as it does not grasp 
its pure concept, which is to say, as long as it does 
not annul time… Time thus appears as the 
destiny and necessity of the spirit that is not yet 
consummated within itself” (Hegel, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
 
The problems of interpretation of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” considered in our 
article are not among the most discussed in 
modern Hegel studies. Nevertheless, articulating 
one’s own position even in this situation is 
possible only by taking into account already 
expressed points of view on the problem and the 
discussions that have taken place. Thus, an 
important step in studying the structure and 
dynamics of the “experience of consciousness” 
was made by the American researcher Kenley R. 
Dove (1983), who, by analyzing the 
“Introduction,” showed the fundamental 
importance of the author’s and reader’s point 
view for understanding the specifics of the 
method and the nature of the narrative in “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit”. In the following years 
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some other (mainly American) researchers had 
addressed this topic (Costelloe, 2000; Gauvin, 
1970; Parry, 1988; Stern, 2002; Stewart, 1998). 
In German Hegelian studies, the role of “our 
consciousness” as the initiator of the 
phenomenological movement and the 
systematizer of “experience,” revealing its 
systematic, “scientific” character, was most 
consistently pointed out in the profound works of 
Werner Marx (1975; 1981). However, a 
significant drawback of these attempts to 
distinguish the “two modes of consciousness” in 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit” is that the 
researchers did not draw the necessary 
conclusions about the structure of the work, its 
relation to the “mature” Hegel system, about the 
particularities of the language and style of the 
work that are impossible to explain without the 
consideration of its dialogic nature. Meanwhile, 
without solving these problems, it is hardly 
possible to see the uniqueness of “The 
Phenomenology” among the dozens of volumes 
of Hegel’s “Collected Works.” 
 
In addition, none of the researchers we know 
considers the “object” itself as an independent 
subject of “experience” (and therefore, we have 
to admit, as the narrator as well!). This “being-
in-itself” that initially appears for “our 
consciousness” (in connection with which Hegel 
constantly identifies “itself” with “forus”) and is 
then given to “consciousness itself,” and finally, 
in chapter VI, unfolds as an independent 
movement of the substance of experience, of the 
spirit as an “absolute, real entity.” With respect 
to it, all previous images of consciousness now 
act as “abstractions,” as predicates, in the logical 
sense, of the real subject of the 
phenomenological narrative. And thus, the 
Hegelists basically pass by the distinction 
between “images of only consciousness” and 
“images of a certain world,” so clearly presented 
by the philosopher at the beginning of Chapter 
VI: “Spirit is there by the self-supporting, 
absolute, real essence. All the previous shapes of 
consciousness are abstractions from it. They are 
just this, that spirit analyses itself, distinguishes 
its moments, and lingers at each individual 
moment. This activity of isolating such moments 
has spirit itself as its presupposition and its 
durable existence, that is, this activity of isolating 
only exists in the spirit which is existence” 
(Hegel, 2008). From this moment on, the new 
“stations” of the phenomenological movement 
are starting to act as “real spirits, genuine 
actualities,” in connection with which Hegel 
speaks of them as “shapes of a world” and not 
“shapes only of consciousness” (Hegel, 2008). 
The correct understanding of the role of the 
“formal” aspects of Hegel’s work has so far been 
often hindered by the fact that researchers did not 
see the “objective instance” of the text in the 
author-reader’s “we” and reduced the meaning of 
“we,” “forus” to Hegel’s “personal position” (or, 
less often, to a certain “absolute” point of view 
on an object that is supposedly accessible to the 
philosopher from the very beginning of the 
story). Although, taking this circumstance into 
account, some Hegelists could not help but notice 
the natural boundaries in the description of the 
experience of “consciousness itself” and its 
assessment by the philosopher. They were also 
able to draw the right conclusions about the role 
of “philosophical reflection” in the movement of 
experience. So, Wolfgang Bonsiepen (1974) 
speaks of the “central role of the philosopher” in 
the process of narrative movement, about the fact 
that consciousness is led by the philosopher, in 
particular, he says that “the emergence of a new 
real object and the accompanying it “introduction 
of consciousness” is realized through the 
philosopher’s actions”. The circumstance noted 
by Bonsiepen is important for the correct 
understanding of the “reading strategy” required 
by “The Phenomenology,” which is indicated by 
the requirement contained in the second sentence 
of the main text: “Likewise we ourselves have to 
conduct ourselves immediately, that is, 
receptively. We therefore are to alter nothing in 
the object as it presents itself, and we must keep 
our conceptual graspofit apart from our 
apprehensionofit” (Hegel, 2008). This 
requirement made by the author applies only to 
the historical and individual components of the 
author’s and reader’s consciousness. It does not 
negate the activity of the subject at all, the subject 
as a transcendental structure “embedded” in the 
text itself, it should not hamper the understanding 
of the leading role of “our consciousness” as an 
instance of the narrative itself. It is “our 
consciousness” – as the unity of the “real” and 
transcendental components – that acts as the 
source and initiator of the “experience” 
systematically described in “The 
Phenomenology,” which deeply penetrates the 
content (“the inwardizing”) and reduces it to a 
concrete unity as “the recollection.” 
 
Furthermore, the issue we are considering about 
understanding the significance of the narrator’s 
figure in “The Phenomenology” for adequate 
characterization of its basic concepts (“time,” 
“history,” “recollection”), as far as we know, has 
not yet been brought up in Hegel studies. At the 
same time, the meaning of “recollection” for the 
description of the figuratively conceptual 
structure of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” was 
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revealed and very clearly represented in the 
works of Donald P. Verene (1985; 2007). In most 
other publications about time, history and 
recollection, which come to the fore in the 
conclusive fragments of Chapter VIII (Baptist, 
2006; Blumenfeld, 2013; Falke, 1996; Flay, 
1991; Ricci & Sanguinetti, 2013; Ricci, 2013), 
the authors restrict themselves to disclosing the 
provision on the sublation of “time” and 
“history” in the “Absolute knowing.” In essence, 
they refused to comprehend why Hegel 
nevertheless focuses here on concepts that 
“remain in the past” of the movement of systemic 
thought and do not go into “Logic.” The 
philosophy historians don’t pay due attention to 
the path traveled as a condition for speculatively 
concrete thought, and it may seem extremely 
strange, seeing as Hegel’s words from the 
“Preface” about how not only the result is 
significant, but also the path leading to it, are 
cited in almost every second publication on 
Hegel’s philosophy. It is unlikely that the answer 
to the question of why this is still the case can be 
simple and monosyllabic. But it seems that the 
reason for that lies mainly in the fact that 
“overcoming the objective element” as the main 
characteristic of “absolute idealism” in Hegel 
studies is still understood in an extremely 
abstract way. 
 
Let us refer to the statement of a thinker who 
went beyond the framework of “professional 
Hegelian studies,” both because of his stylistic 
merits and because he reflected a certain “general 
impression” of Hegelian philosophy, so 
widespread and influential that ignoring it is 
unacceptable even for professional historians of 
philosophy. This is a formula of Merab 
Mamardashvili (2002) from his course on 
Kantian philosophy, presented to the reader in 
the form of “Kantian Themes”: “Hegel had built 
this concept of development, enunciating it in 
“The Phenomenology of Spirit,” where it was not 
a question of consistent empirical development, 
but of a certain development of living entities, 
which I call ontological abstractions of order that 
unfold in the fourth dimension. And Hegel’s 
madness consisted of the fact that he presented 
this, firstly, as a kind of soon-to-be-over process 
in which a person at a certain moment drops out 
of the dimension of history and drops into such a 
dimension where time has no meaning at all. Of 
course, Hegel did not consider that the real 
history ends as an empirical history; he simply 
believed that something was coming to which the 
term “time” was not applicable. It’s like the 
Kingdom of God realized on Earth, and therefore 
it is indivisible and undivided within itself in 
terms of time”. The first question that arises after 
getting acquainted with this brilliant fragment is 
what is this “fourth dimension,” what it should be 
identified with – with the concept (der Begriff) or 
with the shape (die Gestalt)? Indeed, the 
impression of Hegel’s “madness” arises if we 
“forget” about the “earthly path” of the formation 
of the spirit after turning the last page of “The 
Phenomenology,” as if by the wave of a magic 
wand we transfer it “to heaven,” in that sphere, 
where speculative thought dominates, where 
there are no traces of feelings, suffering, of a 
person who “takes himself off” in temporary and 
historical existence, thereby freeing up a place 
for the spirit. And to avoid such “oblivion,” 
“time” and “history” are drawn by Hegel into 
“The Phenomenology” – “the chalice of the 
realm of spirits” (Hegel, 2008), over which the 
“recollection” always hovers, which preserves 
the warmth of the human spirit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Consideration of the narrator’s image in “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” is important for 
understanding the internal structure and 
mechanisms of the movement of the “experience 
of consciousness” as the main theme of Hegel’s 
work. The dialogical nature of text, which 
presents descriptions of “experience” made from 
the point of view of “our consciousness,” 
“consciousness itself” and “object,” prompts a 
modern researcher to consider the specifics of 
each of the objects in connection with the 
corresponding type of consciousness. The 
analysis of the exemplary concepts “time,” 
“history” and “recollection” in relation to the 
structure of the subject of phenomenological 
experience allows us to see the connection 
between the “formal” and substantive aspects of 
the narration, to understand the need to interpret 
individual plots of the “experience of 
consciousness” in the context of a holistic view 
of the object, method and structure of the work. 
This, in turn, brings historically philosophical 
science closer to overcoming the tendencies of 
selectivity and fragmentation of interpretations 
so characteristic of Hegelian studies of recent 
decades. 
 
The main result of the study of “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit,” which affects the 
understanding of Hegelian philosophy as a 
whole, is the conclusion about the inadequacy of 
the “logicistic” approach, which ignores the 
significance of the first fundamental work of the 
philosopher for the building of the philosophical 
system and ruthlessly downplays the 
methodological, substantial and stylistic features 
of “The Phenomenology of Spirit.” The 
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interpretation strategy of this unique 
philosophical work should be guided by a 
consistently transcendental method of analysis of 
the “experience of consciousness.” In accordance 
with this method, consciousness, on the one 
hand, is freed from the “empirical history” (as 
said by Merab Mamardashvili), and, on the other 
hand, its structural characteristics turn out to be 
crucial for the search for a further way to build a 
system of philosophy. In this case, the 
“experience of consciousness”, while remaining 
the foundation of the philosophical system, no 
longer disappears into the “whirlwind” of logical 
categories. As the experience of the 
“encyclopedic system” shows, these categories, 
having lost the connection with the element of 
the “experience of consciousness” that has 
procreated them, are faced with the need for 
“naturalization,” correlation of their existential 
status with the nature and the ultimate spirit, 
which causes the degradation of the “System of 
Science” Jena project and subsequent Hegel’s 
systemic crisis. It seems that the noted 
circumstances should prompt the researcher to 
carefully study “The Phenomenology of Spirit” 
as a distinctive and “unremovable” element of 
Hegel’s systemic philosophical thought. 
Researchers should look for adequate means of 
interpretation, on the basis of which the reader 
would also be able to go through the “labyrinths 
of lines” of “The Phenomenology”, so that, in 
accordance with the author’s intention, he would 
be able to recognize and understand the 
“message” about that magnificent 
“Entdeckugsreise” that was once created by the 
philosopher in the element of the language and 
culture of his time. Because without such a 
companion even the most perfect spirit is 
doomed to remain “lifeless and alone” (Hegel, 
2008). 
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